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Burdett Loomis* and Timothy J. Barnett

Thinking about my Generation: The Impact
of Large Congressional Cohorts
Abstract: Large partisan congressional “classes,” once common, have become more
the exception than the rule over the past 60 years. Thus, when they come along, as
in 1974 and 1994 (and perhaps 2010), they receive a lot of attention. Moreover, they
often do help to change the institution of the House in dramatic ways. After a few
years, all such classes lose their distinctiveness and meld into the legislative flow
of the era. Still, these cohorts may have lasting effects in a host of ways, from movement into House power positions, to successful attempts to run for the Senate in
large numbers, to the dispersion of many individuals into the Washington milieu of
lobbyists and lawyers, where they can continue to affect policy. This article takes
a first cut at how large partisan classes affect the institution of Congress, as well
as at the careers of their individual members. Both the 1994 and 1974 cohorts were
important as they burst upon the scene. Yet they have had differing impacts as the
“long tail” of these classes continues to make a mark on politics and policy.
DOI 10.1515/for-2014-5018

Introduction
“We didn’t owe anything to any ward heelers. We were pretty brash, not scared. We didn’t
know that we shouldn’t take on a [committee] chairman.”
– Rep. Floyd Fithian, freshman Democrat from Class of 1974
“We first sent a letter to each chairman asking that they come to one of the [Class of 1974s preorganizational caucus] meetings and talk a little about their committee. To a person, we got
back polite notes saying “No.” So then we sent a second letter saying that we were going to
vote en masse against any chairman who didn’t come. They all came. Even [F. Edward] Hebert
[Armed Services chair], who showed up the day before the Super Bowl in New Orleans.”1

1 Both quoted in Burdett Loomis, The New American Politician (New York: Basic, 1988).
*Corresponding author: Burdett Loomis: Professor of Political Science, University of Kansas,
1541 Lilac Lane, Lawrence, KS 66045, USA, cell: 785.864.9033/785.766.2764,
e-mail: bloomis@ku.edu
Timothy J. Barnett: Department of Political Science and PA, Jacksonville State University, 700
Pelham Rd., North Jacksonville, AL 36265-1602, USA
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Even before they were sworn in, the 75 members of the House Democratic
class of 1975 had changed the way business was conducted in the US House, often
bucking the party leadership as they sought to influence various organizational
decisions. Within 3 weeks of their swearing in, they had proven instrumental in
ousting three sitting committee chairs, including Hebert. Thus began an auspicious run for the members of this cohort, who initially held great sway within party
caucus decision-making and who subsequently, over the next few years, advanced
quickly into committee and leadership positions that they had helped to create.
Twenty years later, another large partisan class helped usher in a new and
historic Republican era in the US House. Like the Democratic newcomers 20 years
before, even before they took the oath of office, this cohort aggressively worked to
change the rules of the game. As Linda Killian recounted in her extensive examination of this group, “They were all for term limits, so why shouldn’t they termlimit committee chairs and even the Speaker? Newt Gingrich learned of their little
idea by reading about it in the paper…. So the first day it was in session, the 104th
Congress passed a rule limiting the Speaker of the House to four terms. The freshmen didn’t know how Gingrich would react when he read about their comments,
but when nothing did happen, it gave them courage…Every time they pushed a
little further and got away with it, it just made them bolder.”2
By and large, the modern US Congress is a model of year-to-year continuity,
despite profound long-term changes across the decades. The membership tends to
remain stable. Even when there is a major upheaval – such as in 1992 when reapportionment, redistricting, and the House “bank” crisis took its toll across party
lines – 75-to-80% of sitting members return. In many congresses, such as the 105th
(1997–1998) through the 109th (2005–2006), only a trickle of new members enters
the chamber. But from time to time, large “classes” of new members come into
the House, often with overwhelming numbers of either Republicans or Democrats.
These classes, such as the heavily Democratic “Watergate Babies” of 1974 or the
horde of Republicans in Newt Gingrich’s 1994 cohort, can quickly and powerfully
change the nature of the institution, often strengthening the hand of leaders like
Gingrich or the insurgent Democratic reformers of the 1960s and early 1970s. The
most recent landslide class, from the GOP wave of 2010, may well stand beside
these previous two groups in their impact on the institution, for better or worse.
Journalists circa 1974–1975, and both scholars3 and journalists circa 1994–
1995, gave great attention to these large, partisan cohorts (75 new Democrats in
2 Linda Killian, The Freshmen (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998).
3 Timothy J. Barnett, Legislative Learning: The 104th Republican Freshmen in the House (New York:
Garland Publishing, 1999); C, Lawrence Evans and Walter J. Oleszek, Congress under Fire (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1997); Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Learning to Govern (Washington, D.C.: Brookings,
1997); David Maraniss and Michael Weisskopf, Tell Newt to Shut Up (INew York: Touchstone, 1996).
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1974; 73 new Republicans in 1994), and with good reason. The Watergate class provided both the votes and the energy that helped Democratic Study Group reformers accelerate their attacks on the seniority system, most notably with their early
contribution to defeating three sitting chairs at the start of the 94th Congress.
Even more consequentially, the 104th’s GOP first-termers provided the core of Gingrich’s broadside assault on committee seniority. Moreover, both classes shook
up the institution and caused a reexamination of the linkages between individual
members, legislative party leaders, and committee (and subcommittee) chairs.
Congressional classes/cohorts rarely make news for very long; often they do
not survive at the polls. The Watergate babies survived extremely well until 1980,
when the Reagan landslide helped push some marginal and weaker legislators to
the side. The 104th Republican legislators did not face a serious Democratic wave
election until 2006, but still they lost many members of the class during these 12
years. Overall, and unsurprisingly, legislators from these and other large classes
do leave the House for a host of reasons, and the distinctiveness of any given
cohort fades.
But that does not mean that the impact of large partisan cohorts necessarily
diminishes. Rather, it may change form and remain profound. A large partisan
class ushers into Congress a host of individuals with similar backgrounds and
worldviews, who were propelled within a distinct set of political circumstances.
Even as their numbers decline, their impact may grow, as they become (sub) committee chairs, party leaders, and achieve higher office. So, during the 40 years
after the Class of 1974 burst upon the scene, its final two continuously serving
members, Californians Henry Waxman and George Miller, both retiring in 2014,
have proven exceptionally important in terms of producing meaningful policy
change across a range of issues. In a sense, such members and their accomplishments represent the “long tail” of decisions that voters made 1974.
To an extent, the impact of large partisan classes is a matter of mathematics. At first, if the cohort votes together, it can move the caucus toward policy
changes and procedural reforms. As time passes, large classes can also benefit
from the observation made by novelist Ward Just’s fictional congressman, Lou
LaRuth, “There are 435 members of the House, and about a quarter are quite
smart.”4 Although some of the less-smart ones will have long careers, the chances
are that the best legislators will prosper – whether in the House, in other elected
office, or in various subsequent endeavors. The wave election that elevated them
to the House meant that they had ascended to “national politician” status, albeit
on the lowest rung of that ladder. In addition, as Glenn Parker observes in his
4 Ward Just, “The Congressman Who Loved Flaubert,” in The Congressman Who Loved Flaubert
and 21 Stories and Novellas. (New York: Mariner, 1998).
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book, Capitol Investments, serving as a Member of Congress can allow legislators
to accumulate a host of skills that will serve them well, long after they have left
Congress.5
In this piece, we will lay out some of the implications of the election of large
partisan classes. But we can only scratch the surface among populations that
enter the Congress together, make their immediate mark, and then move on in
their individual ways. There are patterns, to be sure, but these gaggles of legislators carve out their own distinctive careers, producing a mosaic of ambition,
choice, defeat, and evolution.

A Brief History of Large Partisan Classes
The 104th Republican freshman class in the US House of Representatives is
generally viewed as one of several highly consequential House partisan cohorts
in the post-JFK Great Society era. Elected in November of 1994 and 73 members
strong, the relatively cohesive group came to office with the most media fanfare of
any House freshman class since the political insurgency of the Democratic Watergate Babies class in the elections of 1974.
That Democratic class, 75 members strong and in some ways a model to the
subsequent rising Republican class, made the 94th Congress a memorable one,
especially for progressive Democratic activists wishing to offset the influence of
conservative southern Democratic legislators in the House. As things stood in
1974, the House was less liberal than strong Democratic numbers made it appear
on the surface. Twenty straight years of Democratic Party control in the House
had allowed considerable influence to be vested in senior members, with those
from the South holding many committee and subcommittee chairmanships
because the South’s near-one party system afforded longevity of service to the
region’s lawmakers.
Prior to the 1950s, large freshman classes frequently appeared in the US.
House, sometimes creating back-and-forth control of the chamber. Since 1950,
however, relative partisan stability has dominated. Thus, from 1950 to 2014, only
six uncommonly large, influential, and partisan freshman cohorts entered the
House: Democrats in 1958 (86th Congress), 1964 (89th), and 1974 (94th), along
with the Republicans in 1966 (90th), 1994 (104th), and 2010 (112th). (See Table 1).

5 Glenn Parker Capitol Investments: The Marketability of Political Skills (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 2008).
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Table 1 Large, Partisan First-term House Cohorts, 1867–2014.
Congress

Years

Seats

Seat
Gain

(Seats)

Party
Gain %

Chamber
%

Party

42
43
44
45
48
52
54
56
59
62
64
67
68
72
73
76
80
81
86
90
94
104
112

1871–1873
1873–1875
1875–1877
1877–1879
1883–1885
1891–1893
1895–1897
1899–1901
1905–1907
1911–1913
1915–1917
1921–1923
1923–1925
1931–1933
1933–1935
1939–1941
1947–1949
1949–1951
1959–1961
1967–1969
1975–1977
1995–1997
2011–2013

243
243/292
292/293
293
293/325
332
356/357
357
386
391/394
391/435
435
435
435
435
435
435
435
435
435
435
435
435

67 > 104
136 > 199
88 > 182
103 > 136
128 > 196
152 > 238
124 > 254
124 > 161
207 > 251
172 > 230
134 > 196
240 > 302
131–207
164 > 216
216 > 313
88 > 169
189 > 246
188 > 263
232 > 283
140 > 187
243 > 292
176 > 228
178 > 242

(37)
(63)
(94)
(33)
(68)
(86)
(130)
(37)
(44)
(58)
(62)
(62)
(76)
(52)
(97)
(81)
(57)
(75)
(61)
(47)
(49)
(52)
(64)

55%
46%
107%
32%
53%
57%
105%
30%
21%
35%
46%
26%
58%
32%
45%
29%
30%
40%
22%
34%
20%
30%
36%

15%
22%
32%
11%
21%
26%
36%
10%
11%
15%
14%
14%
17%
12%
22%
11%
13%
17%
12%
11%
11%
12%
15%

D
R
D
R*
D
D
R
D*
R#
D
R*
R#
D*
D
D#
R*
R
D
D#
R*
D#
R
R

*Did not capture majority.
#Added to existing majority.
Source: http:/history.house.gov.

Although much of our attention will be directed largely at the 1974 Democrats and the 1994 Republicans, it is worth taking a brief look at the other large
partisan groups. The newest of these, the 112th GOP freshman class of 2011, has
already made its mark in adding to the polarization and gridlock on Capitol Hill.
With its Tea Party insurgents, this group, while highly partisan, has posed many
obstacles for the House GOP leadership.6 The 112th Congress returned majority
control back to the Republicans and Speaker John Boehner, but the jury remains
out as to the long-term impact of this group. It certainly has had far less immediate policy impact than either the 1974 or 1994 classes, even as it questioned our
idea of how party majorities work (or do not) in the House.
6 Robert Draper, When the Tea Party Came to Town (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013).
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In contrast to the 104th and 112th GOP cohorts, the other three large freshman
groups in recent decades did not bring a change of party control to the House.
The 86th Congress’s Democratic freshman class, elected in 1958, vastly strengthened the party’s hold on the chamber but did not shift control of committees and
subcommittees. What it did do was to sweep into the House (and Senate) a group
of members who would provide both votes and ideas for reform over the next
20 years. Likewise, the 90th Republican freshman class in the House, elected in
1966, helped pad the party’s pitiful numbers in the chamber (up from 140 to 187).
Nonetheless, this class did little to bring the party out of the wilderness, even as
it did provide votes that led to victories by the chamber’s powerful conservative
coalition.
Setting aside the 86th and 90th partisan freshman classes in the House, the
104th and 112th GOP classes are notable because they helped their party recapture
the chamber and the legislative ambition that comes with a hypothetical electoral
mandate. The 89th Democratic freshman class is notable in its short-term influence because it pushed party numbers to the point that liberals could pass much
of Lyndon Johnson’s extensive policy agenda.7 When it comes to evaluating the
consequence of a new partisan cohort in the House, class size and the swing of
seats in the chamber both matter.
In determining what constitutes a consequential or exceptional freshman
cohort in the House, there is no standard rule. In differentiating relatively influential House classes from those of lesser import, it is possible to utilize qualitative
factors as well as quantitative measures, especially as we examine the impact of
a cohort over time. Here, however, for purposes of clarity and consistency, we
suggest a metric based upon the total number of seats in the House – 435 in the
modern era but a smaller number previously. We consider relatively influential
freshman classes to exist whenever there is a 10% swing in the partisan control of
House seats, based upon the total number of House seats available, rather than
the party’s gain from the number of seats held in the previous election.

Large Partisan Classes: 1876–2014
Adopting the 10% rule allows us to examine the substantial number of 24 freshman classes over a stretch of 62 Congresses starting in 1867. The starting point is
chosen because it reflects a renewal of congressional representation for states
that had departed for the southern confederacy during the Civil War. Table 1 lists
7 David Mayhew, Party Loyalty among Congressmen (Cambridge: Harvard, 1966); James
Sundquist, Politics and Policy-Making (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1968).
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US House elections in the post-Civil War era (beginning with the reconstituted
US House in 1867) in which a political party met the 10% threshold for seats
gained. With the Apportionment Act of 1911, House membership was set at 435
representatives, effective in 1913 (the 63rd Congress), thus setting a standard of a
44-seat gain to qualify as a major partisan class.
An examination of Table 1 suggests a US House that has become increasingly stable in recent decades, at least in terms of tidal-wave partisan swings that
produce big freshman classes and an enhanced chance for major policy change.
Table 1 does not, however, provide a qualitative sense of the operational power
of freshman House classes. An analysis of that type requires knowledge of party
leadership dynamics in the House, the political resources and prior political
experience of new members, the cohesiveness of the cohort, and the degree to
which the dominant cohort vision corresponds with the collective goals of the
party’s conference or caucus in the House.
At the minimum, the data in Table 1 suggest that large House partisan cohorts
in today’s world may be more polarizing than such House cohorts in the preNixon era, principally because large cohorts have become uncommon following
the emergence of the 1974 Watergate Babies. After all, as David Mayhew observed
in 1974, the individually based electoral connection had grown increasingly powerful, thus creating “the case of the vanishing marginals,” which political scientists pursued for a generation.8 Most simply, fewer marginal members meant
fewer large partisan swings.9 And the Class of 1974 helped make this so, as they
assiduously protected their gains over the next 20 years.10 In the day where large
classes were common – a new one every two or three elections, or less – new
cohorts tended to reduce the impact of previous large swings. Moreover, relatively
frequent large classes meant that those who survived, disproportionately southern Democrats, could build seniority and exercise continuing, predictable power.

A Modern Example in this Comparative Metric
While the Republican freshmen of the 104th Congress are often treated in our
time as a remarkable expression of this dynamics, it would actually be a mistake
to see them a as unique in terms of their cohort clout. While there is significant
8 David Mayhew, “The Case of the Vanishing Marginals,” Polity 6, no. 3 (1974), 295–317.
9 Still, both individual cases in the 1990s and the partisan swings of 2006, 2008, and 2010 demonstrate that context of electoral safety can change over time. See Gary Jacobson, The Politics of
Congressional Elections, 9th ed. (New York: Pearson, 2012); Thomas Mann, Unsafe at any Margin
(Washington, DC.: American Enterprise Institution Press, 1978).
10 Loomis, The New American Politician.
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evidence as to their cohesiveness during their first two terms in office,11 Table 1
highlights the existence of other post-Civil War freshmen classes of considerable note. Quantitatively speaking, this table identifies classes that relative to the
104th GOP House class are more impressive by a number of measures. Looking at
the raw percentage gain in House seats, there are seven House freshman classes
that experienced the headiness associated with their party adding sufficient seats
to increase their power in the chamber by over 50%. Compared with the 30%
expansion of the Republican House conference in the 1994 election, the 104th
freshman class did not ride the strongest of waves.
In a similar fashion, while the 1994 election expanded GOP representation by
12% of the total number of seats in the House, this gain is modest when viewed
historically. To wit, in six elections since 1867 one party has increased its numbers
by more than 20% of all the seats in the House, including the elections of 1874
and 1894, which exceeded 30%.12
Another possible measure for assessing the power of the 104th freshman class
is the size of the new majority constituted from the entry of any given freshman
class. As Table 1 denotes, the 104th House Republicans held a modest majoritarian margin of 228 seats out of 435 (52.4%). In comparison, nine other influential
cohort freshman classes have enjoyed the advantage of helping their party form a
majority over 60%, the average of the eight approaching 67% – the super-majority
size that allowed for the override of presidential vetoes. In view of these findings,
it makes sense to think of the 104th GOP House freshman class as an especially
scrappy and partisan class: one that exercised considerable influence not merely
because of turnover in the chamber, cohort vote clout, or the extent of the party’s
seat control, but because party-based voting jumped substantially after 1994,13
even as this class reflected the growth of such voting over time.

The Watergate Babies and the Gingrich Cohort:
Adaptation and Polarization
Every congressional class, large or small, enters a particular Congress, with its
own internal environment, political pressures, and relevant issues. One never
11 Barnett, Legislative Learning.
12 The fact that these two elections preceded the post-Watergate and Gingrich elections by
100 years stands as an odd historical tidbit.
13 See Barnett, 1999; Fenno, 1997; Killian, 1998, among others. See also Voteview’s figures,
which illustrate the role of the 104th Congress. http://voteview.com/political_polarization.asp
(accessed August 18, 2014).
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steps into the same river, so to speak, even as it appears the same from the bank.
Thus, the 1964 Democratic cohort, with myriad talented legislators, found itself
serving as “the cannon fodder for the Great Society,” as many members from
swing districts compiled liberal voting records, with the upshot that 26 of 71 new
Democrats in the 89th Congress lost their bids for re-election.
If the newly elected post-1974 Democrats entered a House that was more
than ready to use their diverse talents, the first-term Republicans in 1995, at the
opposite extreme, understood that they were part of an historic partisan movement, led by a charismatic and revolutionary Speaker. And despite having to take
some difficult votes, most survived, unlike the 1964 Democrats. Even as Gingrich’s leadership fell apart over the next few years, the Class of 1994 remained
part of a largely unified Republican majority in an increasingly polarized partisan
chamber.
The Watergate Babies were then, in both temporal and behavioral senses,
roughly in-between. “Even 10 years later, observed Rep. Butler Derrick (D-SC),
in discussing how he worked to get things done in the House, “I go to my
buddies in the Class of ’74. We’ve now moved up to middle management.”14 For
Derrick and his many surviving “buddies,” middle management meant that
they served as subcommittee chairs or as members of powerful committees.
Indeed, virtually all the remaining members of the Class of 1974 served in such
position by their fourth terms (1981–1982).15 But even as they entered the Congress, the post-Watergate Democrats were unusually active legislators. In the
94th Congress (1975–1976), more than a third of them floor-managed a major
bill or amendment, and almost all first-term Democrats offered floor amendments (two-thirds successfully) as well as putting forth successful amendments in committees and subcommittees.16 And seven in ten of them served
on a conference committee, while a similar percentage gave a “major” floor
speech.
Although comparative data for the large 1964 class are spotty, none floormanaged a major bill or amendment, and only 12% offered floor amendments.
To be sure by 1975, the House had become a more accommodating place for new
members, but the 1974 Democrats took full advantage of their opportunities. And
this continued throughout their careers in the House, at least until, ironically,
the Gingrich cohort helped Republicans take over the House, a domination that
would remain for sixteen of the next 20 years. Thus, just when the remaining 1974
14 Quoted in Loomis, The New American Politician 49.
15 Burdett Loomis, “Congressional Careers and Party Leadership in the U.S. House of Representatives,” American Journal of Political Science 28, (1984), 180–202.
16 Loomis, New American Politician 40.
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Democratic legislators were about to wield their greatest committee influence,
they lost the chance to serve as chairs until 2007. By then, their ranks were to be
considerably thinned.
Various studies of the 104th GOP House cohort show evidence of a class relatively legislatively accomplished because it maintained its collective identity with
a bulldog grip through its first two congressional terms. Members of group stuck
together so as to give House Speaker Gingrich and the Republican Whip system
a bargaining tool both in the chamber and when dealing with Republicans in
the Senate. It is widely recognized that while Newt Gingrich was House Speaker
he frequently used the famed (but exaggerated) cohesion of the 104th cohort to
claim impending calamities for legislative progress unless the demands of the
104th were addressed.17
By presenting the leadership’s agenda as the class’s agenda, then tutoring
the class on what he hoped to accomplish, the Speaker was able move his policy
goals forward more expeditiously than would have been the case absent a generally cooperative freshman class. In time, however, Gingrich would learn that class
members had many of their own ideas and that they were less willing to be cowed
or co-opted than he imagined.
Part of Gingrich’s exaggerated confidence that he could lead the 104th freshmen derived from the ways he successfully cultivated, mentored, and encouraged
the class, especially in the run-up to the historic 1994 election. Operating tactically for months prior the 1994 elections (and continuing his educative strategies
thereafter), Gingrich flooded prospective members of the new Republican insurgency with cassette tapes, pamphlets, books, and memos that presented a unified
vision and plan to his prospective troops.
On the other hand, by 2005–2006, the group’s sixth congress, the class’s
influence had waned, especially in comparison to the 94th’s ascendency, not only
because of less committee-based power, but also thanks to the shrinkage of the
cohort to 23 members – less than one-third of their original size. Actually, based
upon interviews with cohort members and their senior staffers in 1997 and thereafter, it appears that the class forfeited much of its sense of class identity beginning with the 106th Congress in 1999. What bound members together thereafter
was not class organization but a sense of legislative learning acquired during the
class’s first two terms in office, as it became part of the party-dominated chamber
under the influence of Minority Leader Tom DeLay and the party-based requirements of the so-called Hastert rule.

17 See Barnett, Legislative Learning.
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The Long Tail: How Large Partisan Congressional
Classes Can Affect Policy and Politics over Time
Although reporters usually lose interest in large cohorts, and these cohorts gradually surrender their identity, this does not mean that such groups do not remain
influential in many ways. For example, although the large Democratic cohort of
1964 was crucial to enacting many pieces of Great Society legislation, the substantial demise of their members in their initial bid for re-election also meant
that they would wield less power as time went on, simply because of diminished
numbers of members who could grasp the opportunities that opened up in the
years/decades to come.18
At the same time, one of their members, Washington state’s Tom Foley,
became chair of the Agriculture Committee in 1975, after only five terms in the
House, when its chair was displaced by the Democratic Caucus vote at the start
of the 94th Congress. He would later become Speaker, losing his seat in 1994 and
thus becoming a part of three major upheavals in House membership. Foley’s
ascension illustrates how luck (in the form of the 1974 ouster of Agriculture Chair
Poage), talent, and durability can shape congressional careers. By the time he
became Speaker, Foley was rarely identified as part of the large 89th Congressional class, yet his experiences as a member of that group and the step up he
received by surviving (in a tough district) the 1966 GOP backlash, gave him a considerable advantage early in his House tenure. And moving quickly into leadership allowed him to demonstrate his considerable political skills.
Thus, beyond a cohort’s survival in raw numbers, the entrance of a large
group allows a disproportionate number of them the opportunity to move into
powerful positions within the chamber. It also, provides the opportunity for the
cohort’s members to run for higher office, most notably the US Senate. Although
many members of the 1974 class failed here, a substantial number succeeded (see
below), and in this way spread the overall influence of this group – albeit in far
less ideological ways than that of other classes (e.g., the long-lasting the distinctive Senate careers of Montana’s Max Baucus and Iowa’s Tom Harkin).
In addition, given the relative youth the members of recent large cohorts,
many of them used the Congress as a springboard to subsequent careers, where
they could enrich themselves and/or continue to have an impact on public policy,
even after an electoral defeat. For example, New York’s Tom Downey, a poster
18 At the same time, one of their members, Tom Foley, became chair of the Agriculture Committee in 1975, after only five terms in the House, after its chair was displaced by the Democratic
Caucus vote at the start of the 94th Congress; he would later become Speaker, of course, losing
his seat in 1994, thus being a part of three major upheavals in House membership.
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boy for the youth of the Class of 1974, given that he began his service at age 25,
lost his bid for reelection in 1992. Subsequently, he formed a major D.C. lobbying
firm, with former Republican Representative Ray McGrath. The Downey/McGrath
team certainly “did well,” in economic terms, but it also “did good” by taking on
a number of pro bono clients (e.g., Cochlear Americas, which provided hearing
surgeries), whom it helped to significant policy victories.
In short, while the immediate and mid-range impacts of large cohorts may be
the most visible manifestations of their entry into Washington politics, a much
fuller, long-term accounting is required in order to assess the overall impact of
their presence.

The First 20 Years of the 1974 and 1994 Cohorts
As the Watergate Babies (sic) and the Gingrich cohort reach the 40- and 20-year
anniversaries of their initial sweeping victories, we can directly compare their first
20 years of experience. This is a limited perspective, to be sure, but it will provide
some outlines of how large classes evolve in contemporary politics, realizing at
the same time that every class’s context is different. We will briefly examine survival rates, attempts to advance (and successes), and post-congressional experiences for those who no longer remain in the House.
Almost by definition, large partisan classes are apt to lose a fair number
of members early in their tenure. Many legislators have won marginal seats, or
even those that favor the opposing party. Moreover, partisan sweeps may usher
into office legislators who turn out not be especially skilled. The 1994 class had
more than its share of the latter. Even as the GOP retained its House majority in
the election of 1996, thirteen first-term members lost their seats, and two others
left (see Table 2). In contrast, the Watergate babies lost only two members in
1976, which was a good Democratic year. But their ranks were reduced in 1978
Table 2 Size of 1974 Democratic and 1994 Republican Partisan Cohorts* during Their First Ten
Congresses.
Initial N N after: 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992
1974 Dems

75

73

62

47

39

31

27

26

25

16

N in: 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
1994 GOP

73

58

50

42

32

30

23

14

10

7

*For those with continuous service.
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(six losing candidates) and especially 1980, when 12 members of the class lost
their seats.
Overall, the ranks of the two large classes declined in roughly similar numbers
over the course of their first 12 years see (Table 2). But the 1974 group remained
more intact through the late 1980s, as their members moved into increasing positions of responsibility. The Republicans from the 1994 class, on the other hand,
retired in greater numbers, often as a result of personal pledges to limit their
terms. (See Table 3) No member of the ’74 class made such a pledge.
What Table 2 omits, however, is that between losing elections and retirements in 1992 and 1994, the Democratic Class of 1974 dropped from 25 members
in the 102nd Congress (1991–1992) to just eight in the 104th Congress (1995–1996).
Although eight of the Watergate babies lost in 1992, the year of the banking
scandal and reapportionment/redistricting, none were defeated in 1994. But,
perhaps anticipating trouble, six retired. Only eight of their members remained
to endure minority status for the first time in their careers. Of those eight in the
subsequent 20 years, just two were defeated, while six retired, culminating with
Waxman and Miller before the 2014 elections. Only those two, plus Minnesota’s
Jim Oberstar, stayed in the House long enough to wield power as committee
chairs in the 110th and 111th Congresses (2007–2011), with Oberstar losing his
seat in a 2010 upset.
Looking at the exit paths for these two large classes, the similarities outweigh any differences, especially given the wave of Democratic retirements in the
run-up to the 1994 elections. Indeed, there is some irony that so many remaining
Democrats from the Class of 1974 decided to leave, just prior to the impressive
entrance of the Gingrich cohort into the House. Taking into account the actions
of members from both classes, after electoral defeat, the two major avenues for
leaving the House are choosing retirement or seeking a Senate seat. Twenty-nine
members from the two groups retired and twenty-nine sought a Senate seat,

Table 3 Exiting the House: The First Twenty Years of the Partisan Classes of 1974 and 1994*.
Left via:

1974 Democrats, (N = 60)
1994 Republicans, (N = 66)

Retirement

10
19

Lost Election

Sought
Senate

Sought
Gov.

Gen.

Primary

Won

Lost

Won

Lost

26
24

6
3

6
5#

9
9

2
1

0
3

Died

1
2

*Several members of the Class of 1994 returned to the House after defeat within the first 20
years.
#
One senator was appointed.
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eleven successfully. In a sense, both these choices involve “exit” in Hirschman’s
terminology, albeit through different routes.19
Given that the average age of these classes is relatively low and that most
members leave the House within a decade (61 of 148 total of the two classes remain
into the sixth term), a substantial amount of a cohort’s impact may actually take
place after its members exit the House. Although a (very) few members opt to run
for governor, of those remaining in government, the largest group moves into the
Senate. At the same time, most of those who retire or lose end up in the private
sector, and here the differences between the two classes are substantial.

Moving Up
One measure of the impact of any congressional cohort is the number of individuals who have successfully moved up the political ladder. The obvious two targets
are the Senate and home-state governorships, although Cabinet positions and
even the presidency are not beyond aspiration. Clearly, and unsurprisingly, the
Senate is the preferred target, and, as noted, large numbers of legislators from
both classes have sought Senate seats. Both classes have had their successes in
seeking the Senate, although on balance the impact of the Class of 1994 Reublicans has been greater.
Seven Class of 1994 MCs advanced to the upper chamber, with five (Brownback [KS], Chambliss[GA], Graham[SC], Burr[NC], and the appointed Wicker[MS])
coming directly from the House, while Ensign[NV] lost an initial Senate race
in 2000 only to win in 2002, and Tom Coburn honored a term-limit pledge and
left the House before moving up in 2004. The overall impact of these members
has been modest, although Chambliss, Graham, and Burr continue to serve,
and Brownback, after an abortive presidential bid in 2008, returned to Kansas
and won its governorship, perhaps as a means of building a base for another
presidential run. Overall, they fit with Sean Theriault’s depiction of the “Gingrich
senators,” who entered the upper chamber from the House, bringing with them a
partisan approach to legislative politics.20
Within the Democrats’ Class of 1994, six MC’s won election to the Senate –
Baucus[MT], Dodd [CN], Harkin[IA], Simon[IL], Tsongas[MA], and Wirth[CO],
while Texas’s Bob Krueger was appointed. The numbers for the two classes are
identical – six elected and one appointed senator, but the 1994 group, with three
19 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, Loyalty (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).
20 Sean Theriault, The Gingrich Senators (New York: Oxford, 2013).
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significant committee chairs (Baucus, Dodd, and Harkin) and two presidential
candidates (Tsongas and Simon), appears, as of 2014, to have had collectively a
greater impact, especially if Vermont’s Patrick Leahy, veteran Judiciary chair and
first elected in 1974, is added to the mix.
Perhaps most significantly in terms of impact, the Watergate Class produced
three Senate committee chairs (four with Leahy) in the 111th Congress (2009–
2010): Baucus on Finance with intense healthcare negotiations; Dodd on Banking
and the Dodd-Frank regulatory legislation; and Harkin on the Health, Education,
Labor and Pensions Committee. Along with the three House committee chairs –
Waxman on Energy and Commerce, Miller on Education and Labor, and Oberstar
on Transportation – there was very little domestic legislation not touched upon
by these surviving members. Thirty-five years after entering the House, the diversity in ideology and in policy interests among the class remained evident, with
the committee chairs as a group definitely tilted in a more liberal direction than
the original House class.
Aside from Brownback, two other 1994 GOP entrants served as governor:
Maryland’s Bob Erlich, who won his first of two terms in 2002, and South Carolina’s Mark Sanford, who likewise won in 2002 and served two terms.21 And just two
Democrats from the 1974 groups – Michigan’s Jim Blanchard and New Jersey’s
Jim Florio – won governorships. Without question, most the classes’ ambitions
focused on the Senate, not the statehouse. After retirement and legislative defeat,
losing a bid for the Senate stands as the most common route to exiting the House.
For many of the policy entrepreneurs in the Class of 1974, the Senate appeared
as a bright opportunity, even when held by Republicans in the 1981–1987 period.
As Illinois Senator Paul Simon put it after winning election to the Senate in 1984,
“I love it. I’m on a five-person subcommittee, and if I can get one Republican to go
along with my Democratic colleague and me, we can move a piece of legislation to
the full committee.” After a decade in the far more restrictive House, even after the
reforms of the 1970s, the Senate looked like a toy-store to the policy-oriented Simon.

Moving Out
In the end, everyone does leave the House, although relatively few leave “feet
first,” in contrast to earlier generations. What that means, conversely, is that
21 Among a host of scandal-plagued members of both classes (see below), Sanford may stand
out as the strangest case, given the public playing out of his philandering, even after he returned
to the House in 2013.
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former legislators have the opportunity to remain active in politics long after they
have exited the House (or Senate). This paper can just skim the surface of these
post-Capitol Hill activities, but one clear difference between the two classes does
emerge: more 1974 Democrats ultimately became lobbyists than did their 1994
counterparts, who were more likely to move into media roles.
The best example of the 1974 lobbyists is probably Marty Russo, who lost
his 1992 bid for reelection and seamlessly became a major D.C. lobbyist, rising
to become CEO of Cassiday and Associates, the leading practitioner of so-called
“earmark lobbying.”22 At least a third of former 1974 class members have engaged
in lobbying or the typical D.C. combination of law and lobbying, reflecting broad
trends in revolving door politics and the rise of insider-based lobbying.23
That contrasts sharply with the 1994 entrants, although a few have become
prominent lobbyists, including J.C. Watts and Steve Largent (coincidentally both
former star football players). Rather, the 1994 cohort has produced a number
of prominent media figures, most notably Joe Scarborough, the principal on
MSNBC’s long-running Morning Joe show. Perhaps as much as any of his colleagues, Scarborough has embraced Newt Gingrich’s public style, balancing
political commentary, showmanship, and good humor to emerge as an influential
voice, not only on the right but also across the political spectrum.
In his under-appreciated book, Capitol Investments, Glenn Parker argues
that, aside from the conventional motives that we ascribe to MCs in office, they
also knowingly prepare themselves for post-Congress employment. Drawing
on a human capital model, Parker states, “rational politicians obtain material
benefits but do not do so through any devious manipulation of policies or office
prerogatives…. [P]oliticians anticipate the returns that can be obtained through
on-the-job investments in human capital and accordingly adjust their activities
in office….[L]egislators profit from the skills they have acquired, the contacts they
have made, and more generally the human capital they have acquired.”24
Former Representatives Russo and Scarborough offer apt illustrations of
Parker’s thesis. Russo, as a Chicago-based insider with a gregarious personality,
could move easily into the world of high-powered lobbying from his seat on the
Ways and Means Committee, which he occupied for 14 years. Scarborough, on the
other hand, voluntarily resigned from the Congress in 2001, in his fourth term,
22 See Robert Kaiser, So Damned Much Money (New York: Vintage, 2010).
23 See, among others, Timothy M. LaPira, Herschel F. Thomas III and Frank Baumgartner, “The
Two Worlds of Lobbying: Washington Lobbyists in the Core and on the Periphery,” Interest
Groups & Advocacy 3, no. 3 (October) (2014) 210–45.
24 Glenn Parker, Capitol Investments: The Marketability of Political Skills (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 2008), 4.
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and quickly used his personality and media savvy to become a broadcast personality and analyst. Russo certainly would have been happy to stay in the House,
at least as long as Democrats held a majority, but for Scarborough the long slog
through the House hierarchy held few attractions.
By and large, the Class of 1974 members were more likely to stay in Washington than were those who entered in 1994. The Watergate babies grew up with
a Washington that they helped to create and that they felt comfortable with.
Several in the Gingrich cohort limited themselves to three terms, and left. Others
were never socialized into the Washington scene, with some never establishing
a D.C. residence. Still, one size does not fit all, and some individuals from both
classes would be able to navigate the D.C. waters in any weather.
Take, for example, former Representatives Norm Mineta (D-CA) and Ray
LaHood (R-IL), both of whom ended up serving in the cabinet of a president from
the opposing party – Mineta as Secretary of Transportation for George W. Bush,
and LaHood in the same job for Barack Obama. With their muted ideologies,
warm personalities, and willingness to reach across the aisle, they would have
been perfect candidates for such jobs in any era. While Mineta was not out of the
mainstream of the 1974 class, LaHood was clearly more moderate than his colleagues, and the ones who followed him into the House. The fact that he accepted
an Obama appointment sets him apart from almost all contemporary GOP House
members.
The range of successful post-Congress careers is great for both classes, but the
1974 group again is especially noteworthy. Paul Simon wrote twenty-plus books
and started a major policy institute at Southern Illinois University. Bob Edgar, a
minister, became head of Common Cause. Tim Wirth served as an ambassador.
Bob Carr and Rick Nolan returned to the House, with Nolan’s 30-year hiatus representing a congressional record.
The classes did not socialize all their members in similar ways, but the combination of entering in a wave, helping to change the House in ways the new
members desired, and obtaining a set of skills relevant to both legislative and
post-legislative work provides useful ways to think about how a single electoral
event can produce changes that reverberate over decades. At the same time, some
mention is merited of the number of scandals that members of both these groups
brought upon themselves. About 10% of each group was tarnished by a significant public scandal, often leading to defeat at the polls. And this does not even
count the “victims” of the 1992 House bank scandal, in which many members
regularly wrote bad checks on their official accounts with the payroll office.25
25 Gary C. Jacobson and Michael Dimick, “Checking Out: The Effects of Overdrafts on the 1992
Elections,” American Journal of Political Science 8, no. 3 (August), (1994), 601–24.
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Both sexual (1974: Jenrette, Richmond; 1994: Foley) and financial scandals
seemed commonplace, although any large group is likely to attract attention
with its problems. Still, for all our notion of legislative learning/socialization in
various dimensions (learning to legislate, learning to govern, developing skills,
and – at least for the 1974 group – learning some norms), a lot of these legislators
pushed past the bounds of propriety and, sometimes, legality. Large classes and
favorable political situations for one party may attract a disproportionate number
of candidates who would not run – or win – in regular electoral contexts. On the
other hand, having a John (and Rita) Jenrette and a Freddie Richmond in your
class will mean that things will rarely be boring.

Large Classes: Important, to a Point
With their very numbers and sometimes historical significance, large congressional cohorts can have – or seem to have – disproportionate impact on the institution, its politics, and its policies. Moreover, these classes feed large numbers
of individuals into the first rungs of significant national politics, where they
may move in many directions, especially after leaving the House. At the same
time, looking over the classes of 1974 Democrats and 1994 Republicans, we were
struck by how many members came on stage as essentially political extras, only
to vanish from public view. For many members of these groups, their greatest
impact came with the votes they cast, alongside their fellow classmates, as they
either tormented or supported their leaders – or some of both.
To a certain extent, these large classes are never more important than in
their first few days. The very fact that they have entered the House and have profoundly changed the balance of power, either between the parties or within them,
is enough. Gingrich’s turbulent group worked together to a point, but their existence as part of the GOP takeover might well have been their most significant contribution. On the other hand, while the Watergate babies came in with a bang and
immediately affected how the House was run, their long-term effects over 40 years
have been substantial, as they moved the chamber first to a highly decentralized
body, but then helped generate an increasingly powerful party system.
The best of those legislators, such as a Henry Waxman or a George Miller in
different ways, could negotiate paths between the committees and the leadership. As new cohorts develop in a highly partisan Congress, such skills, while
highly useful, may be in short supply. So as the Class of 1974 leaves the stage,
and the 1994 cohort shrinks toward being a pool of water on the floor, we may
first want to look back and more rigorously assess their impacts, and second we
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might look ahead and assess the emerging impact of the “Tea Party” Republican
Class of 2010.
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